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CIA was right after all

Among the many items of useful information in the now-banned secret Army report on Vietnam, this fact emerges: The intelligence services were a great deal more right than the little clique around President Johnson who weighed — and disregarded — their information. The fact should be duly recorded in all fairness, since intelligence — Army, Navy and CIA — has been criticized long and often for real or presumed bloopers in Vietnam.

There was, for example, the period in early 1964 when the administration became convinced that the Viet Cong was the creature of the Hanoi government. Its conclusion was that by bombing North Vietnam, it could stop the guerrillas in the South.

Intelligence countered that the Viet Cong was basically an indigenous movement and could not be strongly affected by punishing North Vietnam. President Johnson and most of his key advisers rejected the intelligence advice, and proceeded with plans to "undermine" the Viet Cong by bombing North Vietnam.

The CIA was also early in rejecting the domino theory, contending that the fall of South Vietnam would not lead to the fall of other nations in the area (with the possible exception of Cambodia) and an inexorable spread of communism. Again, the President and his advisers disregarded the intelligence estimates and clung to the theory that they were fighting a war to prevent the Chinese takeover of the whole subcontinent.

"The American intelligence community," says the report, "repeatedly provided the policymakers with what proved to be accurate warnings that desired goals were either unattainable or likely to provoke costly reactions from the enemy," but the policymakers went on serenely overruling the CIA and other intelligence services.

Objective analysis is the business of intelligence, and it must have been disillusioning to the professionals to find their best efforts constantly spurned by the highly placed amateurs in the White House. The report should drive home the lesson that wishful thinking is a poor foundation on which to build national policy.

Viet Study Says Bombing Lull Pressure Move

Second in a series

By Murrey Marder

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Johnson Administration strategists had almost no expectation that the many pauses in the bombing of North Vietnam between 1965 and 1968 would produce peace talks but believed they would help placate domestic and world opinion, according to the Defense Department's study of those war years.

The Pentagon study discloses that some strategists planned to use unproductive bombing pauses as a justification for escalating the war. This idea was first outlined privately by U.S. officials soon after the bombing of the North began in 1965. These planners regarded the lulls in bombing as a "ratchet" to reduce tension and then intensify it, to produce "one more turn of the screw" in order to "crack the enemy's resistance to negotiations," the report states.

Throughout these years American officials regarded their terms for peace as virtually irreconcilable with conditions offered by North Vietnam and the Vietcong. They recognized that the terms for peace talks would have to be eased before negotiations could even begin.

The United States eventually relaxed its terms on March 31, 1968. The occasion was President Johnson's dramatic television announcement that he would not run for re-election. At the same time he also announced an indefinite halt to some of the bombing and Hanoi, to the surprise of most U.S. experts, agreed to start preliminary talks.

Through the 1965-1968 period, the most uncompromising U.S. planners insisted that the enemy would interpret the pauses in the bombing as a sign of American softness, the report states. Consequently, the failure of the Communist side to make a conciliatory response to each bombing lull was used as an argument for escalating U.S. involvement, either in the air over North Vietnam, or on the ground in South Vietnam, and usually both.

President Johnson was often caught in the cross-fire between the hawks and doves over this issue, as he often protested in private.

The Pentagon review also throws significant new light on the public controversy of recent years about who was primarily responsible for urging the President to order the partial bombing halt of March 31, 1968, to halt U.S. escalation, and to start negotiations.

Former Defense Secretary Clark M. Clifford was lauded by his supporters as the adviser who led what came to be called the "struggle for the mind of the President." President Johnson on Feb. 6, 1970, publicly labeled that claim "totally inaccurate." President Johnson ridiculed the claim that there was any struggle for his mind and said that instead it was his most continually loyal lieutenant, Secretary of State Dean Rusk—and not Clifford—who first suggested the partial bomb halt on March 5 or 6, 1968 and that Mr. Johnson immediately instructed him to "get

an operating proposal swiftly.

The newly disclosed Pentagon study—which is admittedly incomplete, especially on White House and State Department activities—presents information that shows a far more complex background for the President's critical March 31 decision than either party to the continuing public debate has offered so far.

The new documentation asserts, in part, that the idea of a bombing limitation was aired inside the Johnson Administration at least as early as 1966 by Robert S. McNamara, then Defense Secretary, and explored by Assistant Secretary John McNaughton. According to this account, it was Under Secretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach in May, 1967, who first specifically proposed a "territorially limited bomb halt" which is what finally was put into effect at the 20th Parallel of North Vietnam.

This study also confirms, however, that in early March, 1968, it was Rusk, as President Johnson said, rather than Clifford, who proposed the partial bombing halt to the President at that time.

But the new documentation also indicates that Rusk's objectives may have differed from Clifford's. Clifford, a "hawk" who suddenly turned "dove" soon after — but not immediately after — he replaced McNamara as Defense Secretary on March 1, 1968, became convinced, as he later wrote, "that the military course we were pursuing was not only endless, but hopeless."

Clifford's goal was to change the course of the war. Rusk's fundamental commitment to achieving the original goals of the war was unchanged.

U.S. intelligence had pointed out that the weather for bombing over the North was turning bad, and "It is not until May that more than four good bombing days per month can be anticipated." The prevailing view, therefore, was that the United States was risking nothing "pause."

A State Department advisory cable later in March to all U.S. embassies abroad, cited in the Pentagon study, in part said precisely that:

"... You should make clear that Hanoi is most likely to denounce the (partial bomb halt) and the accompanying offer to Hanoi to 'not take advantage' of it) project and thus free our hand after a short period . . .

"In view of weather limitations, bombing north of the 20th Parallel will in any event be limited at least for the next four weeks or so—which we tentatively envisage as a maximum testing period in any event. Hence, we are not giving up anything really serious in this time frame."

"Moreover," the message to U.S. ambassadors continued, "air power now being used north of 20th can probably be used in Laos (where no policy change planned) and in SVN." (South Vietnam).

"Insofar as our announcement foreshadows any possibility of a complete bombing stoppage, in the event Hanoi really exercises reciprocal restraints, we regard this as unlikely. . ."

According to the study, the initial paragraph of this previously unpublished cablegram emphasized what the United States had expressed with each previous bombing pause, a priority on continuing U.S. "resolve" to pursue the war if necessary:

"You should call attention," ambassadors were instructed initially, "to force increases that would be announced at the same time" (as the partial bomb halt) "and would make clear our continuing resolve. Also our top priority to re-equipping ARVN (South Vietnamese) forces."

The message clearly did not anticipate the President's startling announcement at the end of his March 31 speech, that he was taking himself out of the 1968 election race in order to try to bring the war to an end and unify the war-fractured nation.

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